Add failure logging/email notification in backup.sh; harden /opt/backup perms

This commit is contained in:
Christoph Haas 2026-09-19 22:20:31 +00:00
parent d06a9eac7d
commit 68aae4715d
5 changed files with 57 additions and 5 deletions

View file

@ -11,13 +11,14 @@ Everything lives in `/opt/backup/`. The connection details and credentials
| File | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `backup.env` | Shared config: server, datastore, namespace, token, key (sourced by both scripts) |
| `backup.env` | Shared config: server, datastore, namespace, token, key, `NOTIFY_EMAIL` (sourced by both scripts) |
| `backup.env.sample` | Template — copy to `backup.env` and fill in real values |
| `setup.sh` | Install the client and create the encryption key (run once as root) |
| `backup.sh` | Full backup of `/` with client-side encryption |
| `restore.sh` | FUSE-mount the encrypted backup to browse/restore files |
| `/opt/backup/encryption-key.pem` | Client-side encryption key (store a copy off-host!) |
| `/opt/backup/exclude` | Paths excluded from the backup |
| `backup.log` | Runtime log written by `backup.sh` (created on each run) |
## Setup
@ -53,6 +54,31 @@ chmod 600 backup.env
4. The client encrypts everything locally before uploading. The PBS only ever
stores ciphertext and cannot read the data.
The client's output is piped through `tee` into `backup.log` (the file in the
table above). The script captures the client's exit status (via
`set -o pipefail`), so a failed `proxmox-backup-client` run is detected even
though its output went through `tee`.
## Failure notification
If `backup.sh` fails it exits non-zero and, when a mailbox is configured, emails
the failure. Set it in `backup.env`:
```
NOTIFY_EMAIL="admin@example.com"
```
Empty (the default) disables mail. There is no `mail`/`mailx` on the hosts, so
the script sends via Postfix directly with:
```
... | sendmail -t
```
The mail body contains the timestamp and the contents of `backup.log`. This only
covers `backup.sh` failures — a *missed* run (host down, cron removed) is not
detected, so monitor the PBS side too.
Encryption is client-side. The key file has no password (`kdf: none`), so
**possession of the key file alone is enough to decrypt** — protect it.